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EXTORTION IN THE WORKPLACE: USING CIVIL
RICO TO COMBAT SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Chief Executive Officer of a major New York
advertising firm persists in flirting with one of his most senior
Vice Presidents. After two or three months of being politely
rebuffed, the C.E.O. becomes abusive. He regularly comments
on her breast size in front of her staff, and rubs his erect penis
against her. On several occasions, the C.E.O. summons the
Vice President to his office for business meetings and demands
that she massage his back while they talk. She repeatedly asks
him to stop this behavior, but the C.E.O. refuses and explains
that the only way she'll stop him is by sleeping with him. After
six months of abuse, she quits and files a federal complaint
under Title VII' and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (hereinafter "RICO").2
1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
2 This hypothetical is based on several sexual harassment suits. Also pended
to this claim would have been claims under New York State Executive Law § 296
and New York City Administrative Code § 8-107. New York State Executive Law,
Art. 15 § 296 (1)(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
For an employer ... because of the age, race, creed, color, national
origin, sex, or disability, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to
hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such
individual or to discriminate against such individual in componsation or
in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 1993).
New York City Administrative Code § 8-107 (1)(a) similarly provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual
or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability,
marital status, sexual orientation or alienage or citizenship status of any
person, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment such person or to discriminate against such per-son in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment
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Specifically, she charges that the C.E.O.'s sexual
harassment formed a pattern of extortionate acts designed to
deprive her of her property interest in her civil rights, and her
business and property interests in her employment. She seeks
compensatory damages under Title VII in the amount of three
hundred thousand dollars, and under RICO in the amount of
1.5 million dollars.3
This Note will argue that certain sexual harassment
claims fit RICO definitions and that the application of RICO in
such situations is valid and appropriate. The few district
courts that have addressed the issue have recognized that
under certain circumstances sexual harassment in the
workplace constitutes a pattern of extortion amounting to
racketeering activity as defined by RICO.4 Section I briefly
discusses sexual harassment suits and their evolution under
Title VII. Section II examines the origins and development of
the RICO statute. Section III presents some of the recent court
decisions that have addressed the issue of whether sexual
harassment claims may be brought under RICO. Section IV
analyzes these cases and concludes that RICO should
encompass sexual harassment claims. Finally, the Conclusion
of this Note provides a brief sketch of how to frame a civil
RICO sexual harassment claim.
I. GENDER DISCRIMINATION: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND TITLE VII
In the early history of Title VII, courts did not interpret
sexual harassment to be a form of sexual discrimination be-
cause they viewed harassment as "a personal attack, not a
gender issue."' They also feared a flood of litigation would
ensue if Title VII took sexual harassment under its already
burdened wings.6 Ultimately interpretations changed, as
courts determined that "but for" a victim's gender the harasser
N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (1)(a) (1991).
' This amount is based on a $500,000.00 annual salary, trebled under civil
RICO's treble damages award provision. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
' Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII-A Better
Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1080 (1989).
6 Id. at 1081.
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would not solicit his or her participation in sexual activity!
Courts now also apply the "but for" test to situations where a
supervisor or coworker creates a hostile work environment for
an employee on the basis of his or her gender.'
Women began entering the workforce during the 1970s
and 1980s in increasingly greater numbers, as the women's
movement advocated issues regarding "women's... subjection
to men with ever greater vehemence."9 Sexual threats, repri-
sals, insults, innuendoes and sexual humor became issues to
be dealt with head-on, not simply suffered with clenched
teeth." Males grew even more resentful as women rose to
positions of power and authority in the business world, partic-
ularly when women gained footholds in the blue-collar profes-
sions which were traditionally dominated by men."' As one
scholar has noted, "[this resentment, coupled with the greater
interaction with men and women in the workplace, has no
doubt added to the incidence of sexual harassment." Indeed,
some commentators have estimated that half of all female
workers will be sexually harassed during the course of their
careers.' Courts currently recognize two forms of sexual ha-
7 1d. at 1082.
8 See Aeritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Rabidue v. Osceola
Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 US. 1041 (1987).
9 Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV. 333 (1990).
" Id.
"Id.
I Peirce, supra note 5, at 1071; see also BARBARA A. GurEK4 SEX AND THE
WORKPLACE 44 (1985). It should be noted, however, that women are not the only
victims of sexual harassment in the workforce, and men are not the only perpetra-
tors. The Bureau of National Affairs reports that companies receive complaints
from men, albeit infrequently, alleging harassment by women. Sexual Harassment:
Employer Policies and Problems, Personnel Policies Forum Survey (BNA) No. 144,
at 16-17 (June 1987). Furthermore, plaintiffs have litigated sexual harassment
suits under Title VII involving members of the same sex. E.g., Joyner v. AAA
Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (LD. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F2a 732 (nth
Cir. 1984) (mem.); Wright v. Methodist Youth Serva., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (NDl.
IM. 1981); Barlow v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 223, 224 (N.. Ill. 1980). Courts are split as to whether these cases differ
from the more common "man on woman" variety of harassment. Some courts have
disputed the validity of same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VIL See,
e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); Goluszek v.
Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. M11 1988). A recent trend of court decisions
holds, however, that same-sex harassment falls within the purview of Title V31,
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rassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. 4
A. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor
requires an employee to perform sexual favors in exchange for
continued employment or job benefits. 5 Under Title VII, su-
pervisors are the only ones capable of quid pro quo sexual
harassment because they alone hold the power to coerce and to
blackmail;' they alone control the terms of employment. 7
As one commentator explains, "[cloworkers, because they pos-
sess the same status and authority in the workplace as the
and finds that "but for" the victim's gender the harassment would not have taken
place, regardless of the specific sexual identities of the participants (e.g., a gay
man would not have chosen to sexually harass a female employee). Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., 1996 WL 93733 (4th Cir. 1996); Ecklund v. Fuisz
Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods,
Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F.
Supp. 1368 (C.D. Ca. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100
(M.D. Tenn. 1995); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., Inc., 1995
WL 241855 (El). La. 1995); Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. For an interesting
and informative argument against the inclusion of same-gender sexual harassment
under Title VII, see Carolyn Grose, Note, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting
the Heterosexual Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE JL. & FEMINISM 375 (1995); cf.
Kara Gross, Note, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1996). There is some question as to whether a bisexual ha-
rasser could be found to have discriminated on the basis of gender. E.g., Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Ryczek v. Guest Services, Inc.
877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995). But see Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F.
Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wy. 1993) ("the equal harassment of both genders does not
escape the purview of Title VII). Nonetheless, the vast majority of sexual harass-
ment litigation deals with situations involving male harassers and female victims.
For the purpose of clarity, when discussing sexual harassment in the workplace,
this Note will use male pronouns when referring to the harasser and female pro-
nouns when discussing the victim. The author, however, does not (mean to) ignore
the multitude of circumstances where a variety of other combinations of pronouns
would be appropriate.
"' Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Ha-
rassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1260
(1987).
' Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
1 Black's Law Dictionary defines "blackmail" as an "unlawful demand of money
or property under threat to do bodily harm, to injure property, to accuse of crime,
or to expose disgraceful defects." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 170 (6th ed. 1990).
This crime is commonly included under extortion or criminal coercion statutes.
, Anderson, supra note 14, at 1260.
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victim, are deemed legally incapable of applying the direct
extortionate pressure necessary for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment."8
The employer is vicariously liable 9 for quid pro quo ha-
rassment committed by its supervisor employee, whether or
not the employer is aware of the harassment.' In Miller v.
Bank of America,2' the Ninth Circuit held that a supervisor
had acted within the scope of his employment when he sexual-
ly harassed a subordinate female employee. The court reasoned
that "respondeat superior' does apply here [because] the ac-
tion complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to hire,
fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or re-
commend such actions, although what the supervisor is said to
have done violates company policy."
The Ninth Circuit holding reveals that limited recourse is
available to an employee who is sexually harassed by the very
person she must turn to for help. The risks in attempting to
communicate with her supervisor's supervisors are high in-
deed, and the benefits are questionable. Even if she is believed,
there is no guarantee that any action will be taken on her
behalf, and there is, in fact, a good possibility that her supervi-
sor will retaliate against her with even greater harassment.
The only way to clear this hurdle, and provide a viable cause of
action for the victim, is to impose liability on the one who
vested authority in the harasser in the first place: the employ-
er.
"8Anderson, supra note 14, at 1260 (emphasis added).
"Vicarious liability" is '[t]he imposition of liability on one person for the ac-
tionable conduct of another, based solely on a relationship between the two per-
sons ... for example, the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee."
BLAcES LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1566.
21 See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985).
21 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
"Respondeat superior" means, literally, l]et the master answer .... Under
[this] doctrine an employer is liable for injury to person or property of another
proximately resulting from acts of [an] employee done within the scope of his
employment in the employer's service." BlACKs LAW DICTONARY, supra note 16, at
1311.
2 Miler, 600 F.2d at 213.
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B. Hostile Work Environment Harassment
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the United States
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may pursue a sexual ha-
rassment claim against an employer under Title VII for a hos-
tile work environment.' The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of Sex' define a sexually hostile work envi-
ronment as one "unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment."26 This broad definition covers
many varieties of behavior:
[A hostile work environment] can encompass anything from the
verbal and pictorial (crude language, lewd pictures placed on co-
workers' desks, sexual limericks inscribed on bathroom stalls, off-
color jokes) to offensive physical acts (touching, brushing against,
grabbing, indecent exposure)"
Unlike a quid pro quo claim, either supervisors or cowork-
ers can create a sexually hostile environment; the actor need
not possess greater power than the victim in the workplace.'
Courts generally agree that in order for an employer to incur
liability for harassment by a victim's coworkers, the employer,
through its agents or supervisory personnel, must have known
of the alleged sexual harassment and must have failed to take
"prompt and appropriate corrective action."
Courts are split, however, as to the appropriate standard
of liability for an employer facing hostile environment claims
against supervisors. One view is that courts should not impose
vicarious liability upon the employer because the delegated
power of a supervisor does not aid him or her in creating a
sexually hostile work environment. 0 Courts espousing this
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
' EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1980).
28 Id.
27 Id.
' Anderson, supra note 14, at 1261.
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
2 See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Intl, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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"use of delegated power" approach argue that the supervisor,
in such situations, engages in personal acts outside the scope
of his authority. For example, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that "[w]hen a supervisor gratuitously insults an employee, he
generally does so for his reasons and by his own means. He
thus acts outside the actual or apparent scope of the authority
he possesses as a supervisor."3' Another view is that courts
should direct their attention exclusively to the managerial
level of the harasser." Courts adopting the "managerial level"
approach find the employer to be vicariously liable for any
conduct of a supervisor contributing to a sexually hostile work
environmentS reasoning that the supervisor acts within the
scope of his employment when he harasses a subordinate, and
therefore, that his offense is attributable to the employer.'
Both approaches comport with the EEOC's Guidelines.
II. THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS AcT
Congress passed RICO in 1970 as part of the Organized
Crime Control Act (OCCA),36 in order to pursue the "eradica-
tion of organized crime in the United States.' By passing
the OCCA, Congress sought to respond to the public's rising
concern with crime in America, particularly organized crime."
" Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
' See Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773 (2d1 Cir. 1994); Bohen v.
City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir. 1986); Vinson v. Taylor, 753
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985) affd sub nom., Meritor Say. Bank v. V Fmon, 477 U.S.
57 (1986); Rimedio v. Revlon, 528 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
' Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1189; Vin.son, 753 F.2a at 149-50; Rinidi'o, 528 F. Supp.
at 1388.
Id,
"[Ain employer ... is responsible for (the acts] of its agents and supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific
acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regard-
less of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence." 29
C.F.. § 1604.11(c) (1986).
' Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (1988 &- Supp. H 1990)).
I& at 923.
"Michael S. Kelley, "Something Beyond": The Unconstitutional Vagueness of
RICO's Pattern Requirement, 40 CATI. U. L. REV. 331, 333 (1991). During heated
debate over the bill's passage, Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), one of the bill's
original sponsors, made this plea:
Again, I insist that the crime situation in America today is such, and is
progressing so rapidly, that it is imperative that this branch of Govern-
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More specifically, it enacted RICO to deal with the peculiar
threat of mob infiltration of legitimate business. 9 Congress
originally conceived the OCCA to be a tool to punish those who
invested criminal profit in legitimate "enterprise" and those
who acquired or operated interests in legitimate enterprise
through a "pattern of racketeering activity."0
RICO, however, reaches well beyond organized crime to a
myriad of areas in American life. The Supreme Court held, in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,4 that RICO's application to
both illegitimate and legitimate business is consistent with its
original purpose. Justice White explained:
Instead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals,
[RICO] has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against
"respected and legitimate 'enterprises.'" Yet Congress wanted to
reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. The former
enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immu-
nity from its consequences. The fact that § 1964(c) is used against
respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically
identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming
that the provision is being misconstrued... [Tihe fact that RICO
has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.4'
After Sedima, in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.,43 the Supreme Court dispensed with the notion that RI-
CO should apply only to activities characteristic of organized
crime, or to "an organized-crime-type perpetrator. " 44 Such a
notion, according to the Court, would lead to the conclusion
that one must prove that the alleged racketeering activity was
committed by a group or association, rather than an individu-
ment, at least, take every action, enact every law, fashion every tool it
can possibly fashion within the framework of the Constitution, to enable
our law enforcement agencies and officials to combat the growing menace
of crime.
116 CONG. REc. 25,193 (1970).
"Gerard E. Lynch, Symposium-Reforming RICO: If, Why, and How? A Con-
ceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 769, 770
(1990).
" Id. at 770.
" 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
Id. at 499.
492 U.S. 229 (1989).
"Id. at 243. The Court defined an "organized-crime-type perpetrator" as "an
association dedicated to the repeated commission of criminal offenses." Id.
[Vol. 61:965
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al.' Neither the language of the statute nor its legislative
history supports this interpretation. RICO imposes criminal
and civil liability on "any person" who makes use of or invests
finances earned from a "pattern of racketeering activity" to
gain holdings or to run a business engaged in interstate com-
merce." Had Congress truly desired to limit the statute's
scope to organized crime, it would have tailored its language to
fit that purpose.
Other sections of the OCCA are instructive on this point.
Title V of the OCCA is one example of a narrowly tailored
statute. It authorizes the Attorney General to provide witness
protection for individuals participating "in an official proceed-
ing concerning an organized criminal activity."7 Similarly,
Title VI of the OCCA allows, for the purpose of preserving tes-
timony, the deposition of a witness testifying against "a person
who is believed to have participated in an organized criminal
activity.' That Congress specifically chose not to limit RICO
in this way strongly indicates a desire to create a broader
scope for the statute that encompasses more than merely orga-
nized crime.49 Indeed, the Congressional Record abounds with
support for RICO's broad application. Senator John L.
McClellan, the statute's principal sponsor, stated:
The danger posed by organized crime-type offenses to our society
has, of course, provided the occasion for our examination of the
working of our system of criminal justice. But should it follow...
that any proposals for action stemming from that examination be
limited to organized crime? iT~his line of analysis... is seriously
defective in several regards. Initially, it confuses the occasion for
reexamining an aspect of our system of criminal justice with the
" Id. at 244.
4S 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
47 18 U.S.C. § 3521(a)(1) (1984) (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
4 Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 245.
E.g., 116 CoNG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (comments by Rep. Richard Poff concern-
ing difficulty in defining organized crime 'precisely and defintively" and the dilem-
ma of attempting to limit prohibitions to 'a certain type of defendant"); 116 CONG.
REC. 35,205 (1970) (statement of Rep. Abner MLkva indicating that "the salutary
purposes for which this bill aimed at organized crime was intended, somehow
never c[alme to fruition"); 116 CoNG. REC. 18,913-14 (1970) (statement of Sen.
John L. McClellan supporting the notion that civil RICO extends its coverage to
legitimate business); 116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (1970) (statement of Rep. Abner
Mikva questioning the wisdom of limiting civil RICO "to organized crime").
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proper scope of any new principle or lesson derived from that reex-
amination.6
Another RICO sponsor, Representative Richard Poff, stat-
ed:
It is true that there is no organized crime definition in many parts
of the bill. This is, in part, because it is probably impossible precisely
and definitively to define organized crime. But if it were possible, I
ask my friend, would he not be the first to object that in criminal
law we establish procedures which would be applicable only to a
certain type of defendant? 2
Such statements clearly indicate that, although lawmakers
may have initially intended to focus resources on the fight
against organized crime, they never intended for RICO to ad-
dress organized crime exclusively. Congress understood that it
would be too difficult to construct an effective statute covering
most commercial activities, without also including violations
committed by legitimate enterprise."
A. The Private Attorneys General: Civil RICO
Section 1964 empowers private parties to pursue civil
remedies under RICO if they can demonstrate that a pattern of
racketeering activity injured them in either their business or
property.' RICO permits any person alleging a section 1964
violation to bring suit in a federal court and to recover treble
her damages, as well as litigation costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees.55 In addition, federal courts are empowered to
issue divestiture orders, restrict a violator's future activities,
and order the reorganization or liquidation of an enterprise. 6
The Supreme Court recognized that empowering private
citizens to pursue civil actions against RICO violators "bring[s]
"' Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added) (quoting 116 Cong. Rec.
18,913-18,914 (1970) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan)).
62 Id. at 247 (citing 116 CoNG. REC. 35,204 (1970)).
- Id. at 247 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 18,940) (1970) (statement of Sen. John L.
McClellan)).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1988). The Attorney General of the United States may
pursue civil claims against violators as well, so long as those proceedings com-
mence before the final resolution of the private action. Kelley, supra note 38, at
339.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
Kelley, supra note 38, at 339.
[Vol. 61: 965
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... the pressure of 'private attorneys general" who can assist
the government in prosecuting racketeering activity."' Indeed,
by including civil remedies, Congress greatly increased the
number of those who police RICO,' and thus expanded the
overall effectiveness of the statute.
B. RICO Definitions
All civil RICO plaintiffs must prove injury to business or
property due to a pattern of racketeering activity. 9 The plain-
tiff must show a nexus between the racketeering activity and
the injury,' and the racketeering activity must constitute
"enduring criminal conduct."6'
1. Tangible and Intangible Property
Courts accept the general principle that RICO embraces
both tangible and intangible property, and find that patterns of
racketeering activity directed at intangible property interests
constitute legitimate violations.'
Agency Holding Corp. v. MNalley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987).
Kelley, supra note 38, at 340.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
Sharpe v. Kelley, 835 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.Mass. 1993); see Feinstein v. Rezo-
lution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1991); Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893
F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1990).
1 The term "tangible property" comprehends all physical items or possessions,
including all financial interests an individual may hold. United States v. Lotal
560, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 US.
1140 (1986). "Intangible property" includes a claimant's legal rights, whether they
be statutory or contractual see United States v. Zemel, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (intangible property interest in the right
to solicit business accounts); United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979) (intangible property interest in the right
to freely conduct business without wrongful external influence); United States v.
Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973) (intangible
property interest in the right to solicit business accounts); United States v.
Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970) (intangi-
ble property interest in the right to solicit business accounts). Courts frequently
afford protection to statutory rights and entitlements as if they were property. See
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 US. 593
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held that "'property' denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by 'exist-
ing rules or understandings." Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72.
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As the Third Circuit articulated in United States v. Local
560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the RICO
statute utilizes the definition of extortion as interpreted under
the Hobbs Act, criminal RICO and "the language of the Hobbs
Act makes no distinction between tangible and intangible prop-
erty."3 Section 1951(b)(2) liberally defines extortion as "the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force .... ." Further-
more, the circuit courts that have addressed this issue agree
that it is appropriate to extend criminal RICO to protect intan-
gible property.65 Courts have reasoned that if criminal RICO
protects intangible property, there is no clear reason to address
civil RICO differently.66
2. Racketeering Activity and the Pattern Requirement
RICO defines "racketeering activity" as including the spe-
cific federal offenses of obstruction of justice, embezzlement of
pension funds, bankruptcy and securities fraud, drug activi-
ty,67 and any act or threat chargeable under state law and
punishable by over one year in prison that implicates murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, the
pornography trade, or the sale of narcotics and other danger-
ous drugs.' RICO requires that the racketeering activity oc-
cur in a "pattern," which is defined as the commission of at
least two predicate acts within at least ten years of one anoth-
er.
69
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the Su-
preme Court defined RICO's pattern requirement, concluding
that Congress "had a fairly flexible concept of a pattern in
mind." The Court held that the legislative history indicated
, Local 560, 780 F.2d at 281.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
Local 660, 780 F.2d at 281; see supra note 62.
Kelley, supra note 38, at 336.
' Kelley, supra note 38, at 336.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). At a minimum, one act must
"occur[ ] after the effective date of this chapter [RICO] . . .within ten years (ex-
cluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of rack-
eteering activity."
70 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
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that Congress intended "that to prove a pattern of racketeering
activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeer-
ing predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a
threat of continued criminal activity."' The two elements of
the pattern requirement must be demonstrated separately in
order to prevail on a RICO claim, although overlap is likely in
many contexts. 2
Although no precise definition of relatedness exists in the
statute, the Court looked to the definition of pattern found in
Title X of the OCCA, the Dangerous Special Offender Sentenc-
ing Act.73 Title X discusses its pattern requirement only in
the context of the relatedness of the defendant's alleged crimi-
nal acts.!4 It states that "criminal conduct forms a pattern if
it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar pur-
poses, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events."6 The Court found no reason for
which Congress would impose a more constrained notion of
relatedness on RICO.7
The Court concluded, however, that there was much in the
legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to impose
far more stringent requirements on RICO than Title X with
respect to its pattern requirement generally." The Court
found relatedness of predicate acts alone to be insufficient to
establish a pattern of racketeering under RICO 8 Rather, ac-
cording to the Court, "[t]o establish a RICO pattern it must
also be shown that the predicates themselves amount to, or
that they otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racke-
teering activity."
79
The question of whether related predicate acts also pose a
threat of continued racketeering activity rests on the facts of a
particular case.0 If the threat of continued racketeering activ-
71 Id.
72 IdL
73 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970) (partially repealed 1986).
7, Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 240.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970).
Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 240.
77 Id.
79 Id,
"' Id- at 242.
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ity is clear, whether that threat is implicit or explicit, a pat-
tern under RICO surely will be found.8 Such a threat could
take the form of a specific threat of indefinite future repeti-
tion, 2 or could simply arise from the predicate acts being part
of an organization's standard operating procedure.' The
Court offered an example:
Suppose a hoodlum were to sell "insurance" to a neighborhood's
storekeepers to cover them against breakage of their windows, tell-
ing his victims he would be reappearing each month to collect the
"premium" that would continue their "coverage." Though the number
of related predicates involved may be small and they may occur
close together in time, the racketeering acts themselves include a
specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future,
and thus supply the requisite threat of continuity. In other cases,
the threat of continuity may be established by showing that the
predicate acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's regular way
of doing business."
The Court emphasized, nevertheless, that what constitutes
a pattern can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, and
must be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances that each
situation provides.'
3. The Nexus Requirement
Section 1964(c) of the RICO Act permits a plaintiff to re-
cover damages for any injury caused "by reason of' a pattern of
racketeering activity.86 Courts have interpreted this section's
language to require proximity, or a nexus, between each injury
and the alleged racketeering activity. 7 A nexus usually exists
" Id. at 242.
Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 242.
'Id.
4 Id.
Is Id. at 243.
Section 1964(c) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
8 GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RIco: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 30 (1992); see Pelletier
v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991); Old Time Enters., Inc. v. International
Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1989); Haraco, Inc. v. American Natl Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
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if the racketeering activity played a substantial part in causing
the injury. The Second Circuit explained in Hecht v. Commerce
Clearing House, Inc.:'
[Tihe RICO pattern or acts proximately cause a plaintiffs injury if
they are a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causa-
tion, and if the injury is reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a
natural consequence.P
The injury need not result directly from the racketeering
activity, however, and courts regularly have recognized in-
stances where injuries occur indirectly from the RICO viola-
tion." The only requirement is that the injuries be proximate-
ly caused by the pattern of racketeering activity.9
C. Damages Under Civil RICO
1. Compensating Harm
Courts calculate damages under RICO by assessing the
harm suffered by the plaintiff due to the predicate acts that
constitute the racketeering activity. The courts then treble
the assessed damages as a means of ensuring that the plaintiff
receives a "complete recovery."3 Courts will not, necessarily,
use the "predicate-act measure of damages' to assess the
damages incurred by the plaintiff. RICO's principal goal is to
ensure that prevailing plaintiffs are fully compensated, and
therefore courts will use an alternative measure of damages in
instances where the "predicate-act measure of damages" is
insufficient. 6
For example, courts may conclude that a "predicate-act
measure of damages" is insufficient where each predicate act
" 897 F.2d 21 (2d1 Cir. 1990).
Id. at 23.
See Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1988).
See Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Haraco, 747 F.2d at 398.
JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 111.
See Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985). Some courts have
held that RICO's treble award is provided for punitive purposes. See infra notes
105-113 and accompanying text.
JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 112.
Berger, 777 F.2d at 1176.
See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 917 (1989).
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comprising the racketeering activity carries a different mea-
sure of damages.97 The determination of which predicate to
use for the assessment of damages and, thus, which to use for
the purpose of trebling those damages, creates difficulties.98
Furthermore, because RICO's predicate offenses are criminal
in nature, many do not provide for damages at all, thereby
making an assessment of a RICO award impossible under a
"predicate-act measure of damages" analysis.99 For these rea-
sons, the courts have adhered to fully compensating plaintiffs
by whatever calculus.0 0
RICO limits damages to harm done only to "business or
property."'0 ' Typically, the courts compute these damages
through either a "benefit-of-bargain" analysis (computing ex-
pectation damages)' 2 or an "out-of-pocket" analysis (comput-
ing the sunk cost).0 3 The plaintiff can recover neither emo-
tional nor physical injuries under the statute.' It is not
clear, however, whether plaintiffs can recover punitive dam-
ages.
2. Punitive Damages: The Trouble with Trebles
Whether one can recover punitive damages under RICO
rests on the justification for treble damages.0 5 If the statute
provides treble damages for punitive purposes, then permitting
additional punitive damages allows for double recovery, which
JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 112.
JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 112.
JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 113; see City of New York v. Bower, No. 89 Civ.
4179, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1204 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1991).
100 JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 113.
JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 112.
102 According to Black's Law Dictionary a "benefit-of-bargain" analysis of damag.
es, "gives [the] damaged party [the] equivalent of what the party would have re-
ceived if the representations relied upon had been true." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 16, at 158.
103 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1102 (defining an "out-of-pocket"
analysis of damages as "the difference between the value of what the purchaser
parted with (i.e., the purchase price paid by him) and the value of what he has
received (i.e., the actual market value of the goods)"). The decision whether to
choose one analysis over the other rests on which one, given the facts of the case,
will provide the more complete, but not excessive, recovery. JOSEPH, supra note 87,
at 113.
'o, Id. See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899 (3rd Cir. 1991).
o JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 115.
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is impermissible."6 On the other hand, if the statute provides
treble damages solely for the purpose of ensuring a full and
complete recovery for the plaintiff, additional damages for
punitive purposes may be permissible."° The courts are not
in agreement on this issue.'
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of legislative direction on
this question. When courts attempt to decide
the appropriateness of cumulating punitive and treble damages
[they focus] on a metaphysical question: whether punitive and treble
damages are in some sense the same. A legitimate question of con-
gressional intent lurks there, although it is unlikely--given the
paucity of congressional attention to civil RICO-that Congress can
meaningfully be said to have any intent at all on the issue."
Courts will nevertheless attempt to determine what Con-
gress intended concerning treble damages. This sort of analysis
is highly conjectural and, as one commentator states, "requires
the courts to substitute their own policy judgments for those of
Congress, in the necessary guise of divining unfocused congres-
sional intent."" ° In any case, the courts have, thus far, failed
to resolve the issue definitively."' What is clear is that even
if RICO permits recovery of punitive damages beyond a treble
damage award, plaintiffs may not recover punitives compensa-
ble under pendant claims." Under such circumstances,
courts typically reduce the amount of additional punitive dam-
ages from the RICO recovery"
"0 JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 115. RICO follows the 'single-satisfaction7 rule,
which provides that plaintiffs are only entitled to one recovery for each of their
injuries. JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 114; see Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 115.
'"' JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 116; see Com-Tech Assocs. v. Computer Assacs.
Int'l, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd on other grounds, 938 F.2cl
1574 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Ross v. Jaclde Fine Arts, Inc., No. 2:85-2425-1, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13535 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 1991). But see In re VMS Sees. Litig., 752
F. Supp. 1373 (ND). Ill. 1990); see also Southwest Marine, In= v. Triple A Mach.
Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
1° JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 116.
11 JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 116.
11 JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 116.
11 JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 117.
n1 JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 118; see Advanced Business Sys., Inc. v. Philips
Information Sys. Co., 750 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. La. 1990). This becomes particularly
important when this Note addresses the more direct question of the application of
pending sexual harassment claims to RICO claims.
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3. Equitable Relief
RICO also affords substantial equitable relief to private
litigants."4 Injunctive relief may be the only significant form
of equitable relief that is not available,' although the courts
have not yet resolved this issue."6 Its resolution, however,
will, in most instances, prove irrelevant because private liti-
gants may pursue injunctive relief under pendant claims."7
Furthermore, there is large support among the federal courts
for permitting injunctive relief under RICO when it is used to
protect recovery of damages."8
III. THE RICO SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUIT
It has been argued that federal judges and prosecutors
have stretched RICO beyond the original intent of Con-
gress."9 Congress's primary intent may have been to expel
organized crime from the legitimate business world but, as
mentioned earlier, this was not Congress's only goal. 2 ' If
" Private litigants may pursue a wide range of equitable relief including res-
cission, restitution, reformation, specific performance and cancellation of a contract
or instrument. JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 121.
"" Section 1964(b) states that "[tihe Attorney General may institute proceedings
under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time
enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including
the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper." 18
U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1994). But § 1964(c) states, "[a]ny person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue there-
of in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994). There are many who read § 1964(c)'s silence on
the issue of injunctive relief as barring injunctive relief for private litigants. JO-
SEPH, supra note 87, at 119.
.1. See In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1988); Religious Technolo-
gy Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103
(1987); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Secs., 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v.
Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983). But see Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
11 See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
11 See Hoxworth v. Blinder Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990);
Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986); But see Fredeman,
843 F.2d at 826.
UI Fredeman, 843 F.2d at 824.
,' See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
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emasculating the mob had been Congress's sole purpose, it
could have tailored the statute far more narrowly to achieve
that end. RICO never mentions the Mafia, nor does it suggest
that criminal behavior must be "organized" in any way to con-
stitute a violation."2 Indeed, the only real connection be-
tween the Mafia and RICO is the list of "predicate" criminal
acts defining "racketeering activity," that many consider to be
"characteristic of organized crime."' Even this link, how-
ever, is tenuous. The list of "predicate" acts encompasses virtu-
ally every serious crime in the criminal code.'
Many criticize what they view as a distasteful expansion
and a clear exploitation of RICO. 4 They argue that the orig-
inal conception of civil RICO claims did not include many of
the causes of action now pursued through the statute. The
most recent, and most talked about, example is the application
of RICO to the organized anti-abortion movement.' Not sur-
prisingly, sexual harassment claims pursued through RICO
confront similar criticism. 6
There are two questions at issue, and one should not be
confused with the other. The first is whether or not Congress
had originally anticipated the variety of claims RICO now
encompasses. The second is whether or not the pursuit of those
claims runs contrary to the scope of the statute. These issues
are independent and efforts to link them muddy already cloudy
waters. Clearly RICO's framers did not anticipate that RICO
would be used to combat anti-abortion activists or, for that
" Lynch, supra note 39, at 773. Lynch explains that "[a] single free-lance crim-
inal entrepreneur could violate the statute by committing the required two crimes
and investing the proceeds, or by forcibly or fraudulently acquiring an interezt in
an enterprise." Id.
Lynch, supra note 39, at 773.
"' Lynch, supra note 39, at 773.
"' See generally Committee on Labor and Employment Law, Report on the Ap.
plication of RICO to Labor-Management Relations, 49 REC. A.B.!.Y. 871; Anne
Mfelley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators are Racketeers?, 56
U. lo. KAN. Crry L. REv. 287.
m See generally Mfelley, supra, note 124 at 295-308; Aicrel 1. Moretti, Using
Civil RCO to Battle Anti-Abortion Violence: Is the Last Weapon in the Arsenal a
Sword of Damocles?, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1363 (1991).
'2' See Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 124, at 885;
Fowler v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 862 (NJD. M ic. 1991), affd
979 F.2d 1534 (5th Cir. 1992); Anne L. Kirkpatrick, Use of On-Going Sex Diccrimi-
nation by Union Officials to Satisf RICO "Pattern" Requirement: Hunt v.
Weatherbee, 28 B.C. L. REV. 80, 86 (1987).
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matter, sexual harassment in the workplace. Congress did,
however, intend to eradicate racketeering activity in all shapes
and sizes. Realizing that it could not predict every conceivable
qualifying mutation, Congress deliberately worded the statute
broadly.
Courts that have entertained RICO sexual harassment
suits have addressed the validity of the claim only with respect
to whether it can survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment.27 Thus far, no court has tried the issue
on the merits."s Courts have, however, outlined general
characteristics that must be present in sexual harassment
suits to qualify as valid RICO claims. As previously discussed,
every RICO claim must have five major components. The
plaintiff must show that (1) she has suffered injury to a busi-
ness or property interest; (2) her injury was caused as a result
of racketeering activity; (3) there is a sufficient nexus between
the racketeering activity and her injury; (4) the defendant
committed the racketeering activity as a pattern and practice;
and (5) the pattern and practice of racketeering activity oc-
curred over a substantial period of time. The following cases
illustrate how sexual harassment cases often fit those parame-
ters.
A. Hunt v. Weatherbee"
In Hunt v. Weatherbee, the District Court for the District
of Maine considered an action based on an alleged pattern and
practice of discrimination and sexual harassment'30 against
Rosa Elizabeth Hunt, a female apprentice with the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 40.
In addition to other federal and state causes of action, Hunt
brought her claim under RICO, charging that her employer,
through a pattern of sexual harassment, engaged in a pattern
1" See Fowler, 763 F. Supp. at 863 (granting defendants' motion for summary
judgement); Sharpe v. Kelley, 835 F. Supp. 33 (D.Mass. 1993) (denying defendants'
motion to dismiss); McKinney v. Illinois, 720 F. Supp. 706 (NJ). Ill. 1989) (grant-
ing defendants' motion to dismiss); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D.
Mass. 1986) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
" See supra note 126.
129 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986).
130 Id. at 1098.
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of racketeering activity.'3 '
For over two and one-half years, Hunt endured numerous
incidents of sexual discrimination and harassment." Al-
though Hunt complained to the union's business agent, Robert
Weatherbee, he "condoned and ratified" the harassment and
refused to take action, despite his "power and authority" to
correct the problem.'
The harassment rose to such a level that Hunt finally filed
a criminal complaint against a fellow employee, William Free-
man, when he physically assaulted her at a worksite.' After
the filing of the complaint, several union officers called Hunt to
a meeting, accused her of being responsible for the assault,
"expressed sexually discriminatory animus toward her," '
and ordered her to withdraw the complaint. Fearful of reprisal,
Hunt complied.136 Almost two years later, the Union's shop
steward, Joe Shaw, approached Hunt at another worksite and
attempted to intimidate her into buying raffle tickets for the
Local 40 Political Action Fund." Shaw made "hostile and in-
timidating statements to Hunt, based upon sexually discrimi-
natory animus, [and] ... threat[ened] ... personal injury"' s
if she refused to purchase the raffle tickets. She fled the
worksite, knowing she might lose her job but terrified that she
might suffer personal injury if she remained. She immediately
contacted Weatherbee to ask for protection from Shaw, but
Weatherbee refused to take action." 9
Subsequently, Hunt filed the civil RICO actions against
Weatherbee and Robert Bryant,40 asserting that predicate
acts of racketeering activity were established by (1) coercing
Hunt to withdraw a criminal complaint against her employer
1 Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1099.
U Id.
"' Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1099.
3" Id. The court did not elaborate further regarding what constituted the "cxu-
ally discriminatory animus." Id.
26 Id.
= Id.
"3 Id.
" Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1099.
14 Robert Weatherbee, the Financial Secretary, and another defendant, Robert
Bryant, the Assistant Business Agent of Local 40, were among the union officials
present at the union meeting. Id. at 1099.
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and (2) attempting to coerce Hunt into purchasing raffle tick-
ets for the Local 40 Political Action Fund through Shaw, who
acted as Weatherbee and Bryant's agent. These two acts, ac-
cording to Hunt, established a pattern of racketeering activity,
as defined under RICO.
Weatherbee and Bryant characterized Hunt's claim as "the
wrong type of injury" to sustain a RICO claim. They argued
that (1) she did not allege any "organized crime involvement"
and (2) Hunt's claim actually amounted to an emotional dis-
tress action.1
4 1
The court found no merit in Weatherbee's and Bryant's
argument that their conduct, even if proven, was not a RICO
violation because it did not implicate organized crime involve-
ment.44 The court noted that the Supreme Court, in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,' 4' held that civil RICO claims may be
brought against both legitimate and illegitimate businesses.
The district court held, therefore, that the plaintiff need only
prove that the defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity, whether or not their activities are linked to organized
crime.'"
The Weatherbee court also quickly dispensed with the
argument that Hunt's claim was merely based on emotional
distress:
It is inaccurate to characterize Hunt's action as a claim for emotion-
al distress. The thrust of her complaint is that the defendants en-
gaged in willful acts of discrimination and harassment which "per-
manently disable[d her] from her trade as a carpenter," and she
seeks damages for loss of wages. Although Hunt also seeks substan-
tial damages for pain and suffering, she has not included a cause of
action for infliction of emotional distress.14'
Although virtually every sexual harassment suit will in-
clude causes of action premised on emotional injuries, the
RICO claims themselves must demonstrate injuries to
"business or property,"46 which would not include emotional
"11 Id. at 1100.
12 Id. at 1100-01.
" 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
' , Id. at 500.
15 Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1100.
I' 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
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injuries.'1 Emotional injuries are not irrelevant, however, in
that they can conceivably disrupt a victim's ability to seek
employment once the victim quits or gets fired. The Weatherbee
court found, for example, that the alleged sexual harassment
suffered by Hunt caused sufficient injury to her business and
property interests by disrupting her ability to pursue work as a
carpenter in the future."4 The court implied that Hunt's re-
sulting emotional injuries were linked to her alleged inability
to seek future employment as a carpenter."' This would be
relevant when assessing whether Hunt made adequate at-
tempts to mitigate her damages. Although plaintiffs are enti-
tled to recover damages for lost wages during a reasonable
period of time after being forced from their jobs, what is or is
not reasonable would depend upon the circumstances sur-
rounding termination.5
The court also rejected Weatherbee's and Bryant's argu-
ment that Hunt was not entitled to lost wages under 18 U.S.C.
Section 1964(c). This section states that a civil action may be
brought by any person injured in his "business or property"
through a pattern of racketeering activity." The court noted
that in the context of antitrust suits, the federal judiciary
commonly finds that "the loss of employment constitutes an
injury to one's business or property."'m The court found no
147 Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1100.
Id, at 1101.
141 Id. at 1100-01.
o Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), a Title VII plaintiff has an obligation to
mitigate her damages with "reasonable diligence"; see Booker v. Taylor ?LM Co,
64 F.3d 860, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the court must make a care-by-
case factual inquiry as to whether an employee satisfies the "reasonable diligence"
standard). The burden, however, is always on the employer to prove that the em-
ployee failed to properly mitigate her damages. Id. at 864.
"' Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
112 Id. (quoting McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1116 (E.D. Pa.
1979)); Quinonez v. National Assoc. of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 829-30
(5th Cir. 1976). When interpreting the scope of "business or property it is appro-
priate to follow those cases that have interpreted the same language found in § 4
of the Clayton Act. See Sedima, 473 US. at 484-87; Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at
1100. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that:
[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor... and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
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reason to hold any differently when a defendant's actions force
a plaintiff out of her employment and prevent her from pursu-
ing similar work in the future.'53 The court, therefore, con-
cluded that Hunt claimed a valid injury to "business or proper-
ty" under 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c).
Weatherbee and Bryant also argued that even if they were
guilty of threatening or coercing Hunt, such actions are com-
pletely unrelated to any relationship they had to the union and
would not have benefitted the union." 4 The court again re-
jected their argument, stating:
The RICO statute does not require that the predicate acts be in
furtherance of the enterprise in order to show that the affairs of the
enterprise have been conducted "through" a pattern of racketeering
activity within the meaning of § 1962(c). Instead, there is a suffi-
cient nexus between the predicate offenses and the enterprise if the
defendant (1) is enabled to commit the predicate offense solely by
virtue of his position in the enterprise or his involvement in or con-
trol over its affairs, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the
activities of that enterprise."
According to the court, by coercing Hunt to withdraw her
criminal complaint, and by ignoring Shaw's abusive behavior,
the defendants sought to maintain order in the work environ-
ment, thereby sustaining a status quo of harassment and dis-
crimination toward women. 5  Weatherbee's and Bryant's po-
sitions in Local 40 vested them with the power and authority
to threaten Hunt, and it was because of their positions in the
union that they were able to violate Hunt's apprenticeship
"' Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1101; see also Kubecka v. Avellino, No. Civ. 94.
3022, 1995 WL 500223 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 16, 1995) (holding that where the murder
of two corporate executives deprived those individuals of their business and prop-
erty interests in their employment, such plaintiffs had standing under RICO).
" Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1102-03.
... Id. at 1102; see also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983).
" Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1102. Weatherbee and Bryant argued that the
alleged coercion of Hunt to withdraw her complaint did not support Hunt's claim,
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1994). Hunt alleged that Weatherbee and Bryant controlled
an interest in the union through a pattern of racketeering activity.
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agreement and threaten injury to her employment.'"
Weatherbee and Bryant further argued that regardless of
whether the alleged acts constituted "predicate acts" under 18
U.S.C. Section 1961(5),'1 the incidents did not constitute a
pattern of racketeering activity. They contended that the two
alleged acts occurred at isolated moments, three years apart,
and bore no relationship to one another."O
Hunt, however, argued that the two predicate acts served
only as examples of an ongoing practice of sexual harassment,
sexual discrimination and violations of her contractual rights
committed over a three year period.16 Hunt included in her
complaint other specific allegations of sexual harassment, and
further alleged that Weatherbee and Bryant "encouraged sys-
tematic discrimination against other female members of Local
40."16' The court considered these allegations sufficient to
show a pattern of racketeering activity, and therefore denied
Weatherbee's and Bryant's motion to dismiss the civil RICO
claims."
B. Sharpe v. Kelley'
Sharpe v. Kelley serves as another example of RICO's
application to sexual harassment suits, specifically with regard
to the substantial duration requirement. The plaintiff, Cheryl
G. Sharpe alleged that the defendant, John H. Kelley, engaged
in a pattern of racketeering activity through his operation of
two corporations, Fidelis Group, Inc. and Cyborg Technology,
Inc. Sharpe claimed that Kelley attempted to extort sexual
favors from her by "threatening her financial prospects as an
" Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1102.
Section 1961(5) reads: "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred alter the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
9 Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1103.
o d. at 1104.
161 Id.
Id. For a helpful, but limited, analysis of Weatherbee, see lrkpatrick, supra
note 126.
11 835 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1993).
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employee of Fidelis and as a principal of Cyborg."" In short,
Kelley attempted to "control both the business and private
aspects of her life."
165
The court held that the extortion of Sharpe's property
interest in her civil rights, which included her contractual job
rights and partnership rights in the two corporations, would
constitute a RICO violation.166 The court noted that the con-
ception of property under RICO includes intangible property
and thus an individual's civil rights are not "necessarily ex-
cluded by the Hobbs Act." 67 Accordingly, the Sharpe court
held that because Kelley's alleged quid pro quo harassment of
Sharpe threatened to deprive her of her employment and part-
nership rights, his actions could constitute extortion, one of
RICO's predicate acts of racketeering.6 1
Kelley next argued that because Sharpe only alleged one
predicate act, RICO's "pattern" requirement was not satis-
fied.66 Kelley argued that under RICO a plaintiff must suffer
her injuries from at least two predicate acts in order to form a
pattern of racketeering.' Sharpe alleged only one predicate
act, extortion, which occurred on numerous occasions. The
court observed, however, that Kelley's harassment of Sharpe
had no definite endpoint and could have continued indefinitely
into the future. The court held, therefore, that the repetition of
the same predicate act-in this case, the extortion of sexual
favors-satisfied RICO's requirement. The Court explained:
While Kelley's acts of harassment all share one common purpose-
sex-his conduct would have been capable of endless repetition, at
least in theory. One sexual favor would not have been enough. When
the offending scheme is potentially open ended, and enduring be-
cause the object of the scheme is inexhaustible, it may be reasonable
to view the constituent acts of the scheme as separate predicate acts
164 Id. at 34.
165 Id.
166 Id. Kelley argued that the only conceivable "property" was the plaintiffs
sexual favors, which is not considered property within the meaning of ]RICO. The
court rejected this, noting that the "[diefendants . . .read the complaint too selec-
tively." Id.
167 Id. See United States v. Local 560, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267,
281 (3d Cir. 1985). The "Hobbs Act," also referred to as criminal RICO, provides
for criminal penalties for racketeering violations. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
"' Sharpe, 835 F. Supp. at 34.
Id. at 35.
17o Id. at 37.
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under RICO.'
The court found that the predicates could also satisfy
RICO's "continuity" requirement. Although Congress passed
RICO under the assumption that criminal conduct would occur
over a substantial period of time, the Sharpe court noted
that the Supreme Court never set an absolute minimum dura-
tion.73 Because the plaintiff alleged that Kelley harassed her
over a five to six month period, the court refused to rule as a
matter of law that that period failed to satisfy the continuity
requirement.7 4
C. Two Courts Dissent
1. McKinney v. Illinois"'
The plaintiff, Pamela L. McKinney, was employed by the
Illinois Department of Employment Security ("IDES"), as the
administrative assistant to the Manager of Field Services,
Robert D. Plowright. Beginning in March 1985, Plowright
made "unauthorized and unwarranted" sexual advances toward
her"7 6 by regularly attempting to inappropriately touch her
body. 7 McKinney transferred out of Plowright's department
and supervision, but still encountered Plowright in the office
where he directed "leers, lewd comments, and lascivious ges-
tures" toward her.2 8
I' d.
1 H., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989).
' Sharpe, 835 F. Supp. at 35.
'7, Id. The court held that this was particularly true, given that the plaintiff
was alleging activity that was regular and frequent, rather than merely "sporadie
Id. Citing Northwestern Bell, the Sharpe court noted in a footnote that continuity
could also be established if a plaintiff demonstrates that the related predicates
"posed a threat of continued criminal activity.! Id. at 35 n.2. The court found,
however, that Sharpe was unable to properly allege such a threat because she was
no longer associated with either the Cyborg or Fidelis enterprises. IcL The court
intimated, however, that, although Sharpe did not expressly allege it, it might be
inferred from her complaint that Kelley's sexual harassment was "part of an ongo-
ing entity's regular way of doing business," thereby satisfying RICO's continuity re-
quirement. Id.
'7 720 F. Supp. 706 (NJ). Ill. 1989).
"' Id. at 707.
I d.
IL7 Id.
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In May 1987, McKinney again began working under
Plowright's supervision. Plowright immediately resumed ha-
rassing her with increasing frequency and severity. Despite
McKinney's efforts to discourage Plowright's behavior, he per-
sisted in "propositioning her, exposing himself to her, and
forcing her into sexual contact with him." 9 McKinney later
discovered that Plowright similarly "harassed other female
employees at IDES."80
In late November and early December 1987, McKinney
reported Plowright to three IDES officials: Morton Friedman,
the Deputy Director of IDES, as well as Daniel Flanagan and
Mary Kennedy, attorneys for IDES. 8' Around the same time,
Juliette Hurtz, an IDES manager, also became aware of
McKinney's sexual harassment charges.'82 None of the IDES
officials took any action to deter Plowright or to protect
McKinney." As a result, Plowright continued to harass her,
and, in January 1988, offered to give McKinney higher perfor-
mance ratings in exchange for sexual favors.' To avoid any
further harassment, McKinney stopped going to work on Feb-
ruary 23, 1988, and filed a sexual harassment charge with the
Illinois Department of Human Rights on March 14, 1988."
McKinney used her accumulated sick leave and employee
benefit time to remain on IDES's payroll until April 25, 1988,
at which point she resigned. IDES claimed that McKinney was
discharged for "fraudulently receiving unauthorized overtime
payments during the course of her employment."18
McKinney, in turn, claimed that the dismissal was fraudulent,
that IDES falsified employment documents, and that IDES had
conspired to impede the Illinois Department of Human Rights's
investigation into her claim of sexual harassment.18
McKinney filed three RICO claims in federal court,'88 al-
leging that IDES, through its representatives, violated sections
179 Id.
180 McKinney, 720 F. Supp. at 707.
181 Id.
182 Id.
83 Id.
18 Id.
18 McKinney, 720 F. Supp. at 707.
Id. at 708.
187 Id.
Id.
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1962(b), 18 (c), 190 and (d). 9' Specifically, she alleged that
either Plowright, or any of the other named defendants "com-
mitted the state law crimes of public indecency, assault, aggra-
vated assault, battery, aggravated battery, intimidation, ethnic
intimidation, criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexu-
al abuse, official misconduct, and compelling confession or
information by force or threat." ' The court found, however,
that none of the crimes allegedly committed by the defendants
were enumerated predicate acts under Section 1961(1) of the
RICO Act.
193
Under a Weatherbee or Sharpe analysis, McKinney's ha-
rassment may have constituted a viable claim under RICO.
McKinney, however, never alleged extortion of her business
and property interests in her employment, and therefore, the
court never addressed that issue directly.' Another court, in
Fowler v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., did
address this issue more directly, and came to a very different
conclusion from that of the Weatherbee and Sharpe courts.
2. Fowler v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.
The defendant Cletus Meek, hired the plaintiff, Lisa
Fowler, as a security guard for Burns International Security
' Section 1962(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through collection of an unlawful debt
to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, in-
terstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
no Section 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprises's affairs through a pattern of racheteering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
"' Section 1962(d) states that "lt shall be unlawful for any person to conspire
to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.? 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
"2 McKinney, 720 F. Supp. at 708.
353 Id.
I" d.
" 763 F. Supp. 862 (NJ). Mliss. 1991), affd, 979 F.2d 1534 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Services (CSurns").'9 6 Soon after, Meek told Fowler that her
work performance was unsatisfactory and that he would fire
her unless she had sex with him.'97 Fowler explained to
Meek that she needed her job to support her family. Meek
insisted, however, and Fowler ultimately succumbed to his de-
mands.'98 During a nine month period, Meek forced Fowler to
perform various sexual acts, including oral sex, in order to
keep her job. After those nine months, Meek fired her.'
Fowler alleged that Meek violated three Mississippi stat-
utes through extortion.00 The violations were (i) unnatural
intercourse,20'O (ii) kidnapping by inveiglement202 and (iii)
rape.0 3 First, Fowler claimed that Meek's threats to fire her
unless she sexually gratified him constituted extortion, defined
as "compelling or coercing by any means which overcome one's
power of resistance or gaining by wrongful methods."' ° Sec-
ond, Fowler claimed that Meek had committed extortion when
he "tricked and deceived [plaintiff] into being involuntarily con-
fined in his [motel] room... by means of extortionate threats
and intimidation." ' 5 Fowler's third claim alleged that Meek
conditioned her future employment with the company upon
continued sexual relations with him.
The court rejected these extortion claims, stating, "A plain
reading of the statutes cited by the plaintiff leads this court to
the conclusion that the crime chargeable under each has noth-
ing whatsoever to do with extortion as it is generally de-
fined." 6 Furthermore, the Court asserted that even if it as-
sumed that Fowler's extortion claims were valid, Fowler failed
to demonstrate a pattern, as defined under RICO.2" Basing
its decision on the Supreme Court's ruling in Northwestern
Bell, the Court found that Meek's alleged criminal acts, taking
" Id. at 863.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
O Fowler, 763 F. Supp. at 864.
201 Id.
202 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
" Fowler, 763 F. Supp. at 864.
206 Id.
217 Id. at 865.
[Vol. 61: 965
RICO & SEXUAL HARASSMENT
place over a nine month period, occurred over too short a peri-
od of time and did not constitute a threat of future criminal
conduct."°
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR USING RICO IN SEXuAL
HARASSMENT Surs
RICO is a statute primed for the purpose of combatting
sexual harassment in the workplace for several key reasons.
First, sexual harassment in the workplace is extortion. That
element of the harassment can only be adequately addressed
through RICO. Second, RICO provides an important and via-
ble source of relief for sexual harassment victims. Third,
RICO's four-year statute of limitations allows those who do not
file in a timely manner for other available causes of action,
such as Title VII, to seek a remedy. And, finally, RICO permits
employees of small businesses to seek remedies for sexual ha-
rassment.
A. Sexual Harassment: Extortion in the Workplace
Employment is self-empowering and self-defining. Besides
providing one with financial security and independence, what
we "do" reflects who we are; it is an indispensable conduit for
experiencing a sense of purpose and significance. Courts and
legislatures have recognized as much, and, therefore, have
afforded substantial protection to the intangible concept of
employment.' Courts recognize that the loss of employment
is an injury to one's property.21 For example, the Seventh
Circuit held, in Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, that "the interest
'a Id. at 864.
=' Employment is intangible because it is a contractual arrangement, compre-
hending the continuing exchange of services for financial compensation. But the
intangible nature of employment makes it no less protectable, and certainly no
less meaningful. See Quinonez v. NatVl Ass'n of Sees. Dealers, Inc., 540 F2d 824,
829-30 (5th Cir. 1976); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176
(5th Cir. 1976); Dailey v. Quality Sch. Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967);
Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co. 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942); McNulty v. Borden,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1116 (ED. Pa. 1979); DeGregorio v. Segal, 443 F. Supp.
1257, 1261 (ED. Pa. 1978); Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp.
843 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
210 See supra note 209.
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invaded by a wrongful act resulting in loss of employment is so
closely akin to the interest invaded by impairment of one's
business as to be indistinguishable . . . ."
When an employer sexually harasses his employee, he
changes the terms and conditions of employment, thereby
disrupting the employment contract.212 Employment, unlike
other contractual arrangements, is so tied to identity and fi-
nancial well being that one will often tolerate the most heinous
behavior in order to keep a job. In fact, it is often precisely
because the employer is aware of this that he engages in the
sexually harassing behavior. Sexual harassment on the job is,
in every sense of the word, extortion.213
When one considers the term extortion, it is not unusual to
envision the stereotypical "hood" paying a visit to a politician
and demanding political favors in exchange for incriminating
photographs. RICO, however, defines extortion as "the obtain-
ing of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force.. .. "4 At its core,
the term defines a very simple concept: the illegal coercion of
action, whether that action takes the form of political favorit-
ism, monetary gain or sexual gratification. Threatening to
deprive an individual of her employment, either implicitly or
explicitly, by forcing her sexual complicity, is blackmail. The
employee is faced with a Hobson's choice: submit to the harass-
ment, thereby forfeiting her statutory rights and incurring the
inevitable emotional costs, or lose her job, thereby forfeiting an
integral financial and emotional part of her life.2"5
Consider the hypothetical described at the beginning of
this Note. The senior Vice President of the advertising firm
had probably worked her entire life to attain such a prestigious
and coveted position. Deciding to quit and file suit, more likely
than not, will make securing a comparable position difficult, if
... Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967).
212 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 78 (1986); Sparks v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
213 See generally Sharpe v. Kelley, 835 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1993); Hunt v.
Weatherbee, 626 F.Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986).
214 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
2 1 For an excellent discussion of the extortionate character of sexual harass-
ment in employment, see Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid
Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 213 (1994).
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not impossible, as other companies will irrationally fear that
she is "litigation happy" and not wish to risk exposing them-
selves to similar claims. On the other hand, sleeping with the
C.E.O., or tolerating his abuse, will unquestionably lead to an
emotionally intolerable situation. It is illogical to recognize the
extortionate character of the relationship between the "hood"
and the politician, but not between the C.E.O. and the senior
Vice President. Both the C.E.O. and the "hood" seek to coerce
the behavior of others by illegal means. Recognizing the identi-
cal character of both situations leads to the conclusion that
only RICO adequately addresses the extortionate character of
sexual harassment in the workplace.
The current statutory options available to victims of sexual
harassment do not address the extortion of an employee's busi-
ness or property interests by an employer. They relate, rather,
to the harassment itself. Title VII, for example, is concerned
only with the inappropriate tampering by the employer with
the "terms and conditions" of employment. The remedies avail-
able under Title VII, therefore, seek to make the employee
whole through reinstatement, compensation of lost back pay,
and compensation for emotional injuries."6 Punitive damages
are also compensable under Title VII, but, again, this remedy
seeks to punish the employer for his outrageous sexual behav-
ior and his efforts to change the "terms and conditions of em-
ployment," not to punish him for the extortionate character of
his actions. RICO directly addresses the employer's extortion-
ate activities, punishes him for it, and compensates the em-
ployee for her damages. 7
The extortionate nature of the employer's conduct deserves
emphasis. Statutory protections do not exist solely to provide
remedies for victims, but also to punish undesirable behavior.
Some courts have held that RICO specifically provides for
treble damages for this very reason.218 If one views sexual
216 Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1938 & Supp. HI
1991).
217 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
28 See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 913 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the "treble damages [provision] is best characterized as 'penal in
nature') (citation omitted). There is, however, some question regarding this notion.
See Faircioth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that "the
primary purpose of the private right of action created by RICO is remedial').
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harassment not solely as the twisting and warping of the em-
ployment relationship, but also, in a broader sense, as an ille-
gal coercion of the individual to surrender property interests,
one soon concludes that sexual harassment is not adequately
addressed by present employment statutes. The issue of extor-
tion is separate and apart from the issue of employment dis-
crimination. It is a separate wrong, deserving of separate at-
tention. It is, therefore, not sufficient to concede that sexual
exploitation alone is wrong and undesirable. Rather, one must
recognize that the sexual harasser, in an employment relation-
ship, puts a figurative gun to the employee's head and says
"submit to my sexual demands or lose your job."
The major resistance to RICO's application to new arenas
seems to spring from an inability to embrace a broader notion
of "racketeering activity."219 One opponent explains,
There is a pressing need for clarification of the proper uses of civil
RICO and for a resulting limitation, preferably a legislative limita-
tion, to ensure that the statute is used solely for the purposes for
which it was enacted. Without such a limitation, civil RICO will
continue to be applied in situations far beyond those intended by
Congress, creating the risk that the statute may have to be aban-
doned as an abusive, harsh and overreaching provision.220
This sort of fear is unfounded and misplaced. Congress
intended to eradicate racketeering activity in all forms. More-
over, it clearly supported a broad reading of RICO to achieve
that purpose."' Most opponents reluctantly recognize the
breadth of the statute's wording, which is why they call for
Congress to amend RICO to include more limiting lan-
guage-' The truth is, if Congress had wanted to limit the
wording of the statute, it would have done so at its inception.
As mentioned earlier, Congress knew how to limit the scope of
other provisions in the OCCA, and did.' It simply chose not
to constrain RICO in the same manner. 4
Opponents of a broad application of RICO also color what
2. Melley, supra note 124, at 288.
' Melley, supra note 124, at 288.
2 See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
See Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 124; see also,
Melley, supra note 124, at 287-88; Kirkpatrick, supra note 126, at 86.
22 See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
" Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 124, at 871.
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they deem to be nontraditional RICO activities as illegitimate-
ly defined racketeering activity, and refer to the use of RICO
in such situations as abusive.2 Ironically, those who criticize
a broad interpretation of RICO also question the wisdom of the
statute's broad language, calling for a refinement of its defini-
tions to narrow its scope.'
Such criticisms are unpersuasive. If RICO defines racke-
teering activity to include extortion, it is not an abuse of the
statute to bring a RICO action against those engaging in a
pattern of extortionate behavior. What opponents conveniently
refer to as a "stretching" of RICO, is not a stretch at all,
but a clean fit. Their discomfort is not with the misapplication
of RICO, but rather with RICO itself. The limited case law
that discusses the subject supports this conclusion.'
The Weatherbee court, for example, concludes, quite logi-
cally, that continuous and merciless sexual abuse toward Hunt
by the union and, more specifically, William Freeman and Joe
Shaw, forced her out of her job, and therefore could constitute
extortion. Hunt was clearly given an ultimatum: withdraw
your criminal complaint, purchase union raffle tickets, and
endure the abuse quietly, or face greater harassment or, worse,
termination. The union's lulled acceptance or, more likely, its
blatant encouragement of sexual abuse provided the necessary
nexus between the predicate act, extortion, and the injury,
Hunt's lost employment, lost back pay and future earnings.'
In Weatherbee, the alleged harassment occurred over a
three year period. But as the Sharpe court points out, sexual
harassment claims need not be held to a stringent standard of
what constitutes "enduring criminal conduct." The Supreme
I Committee on Labor and Employment Law, oupra note 124, at 871; cce ako
]Melley, supra note 123, at 312.
11 Mfelley, supra note 124, at 287, 312; Committee on Labor and Employment
Law, supra note 124, at 893-94.
' Mfelley, supra note 124, at 287.
2 See Sedima, SPILL. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Northeast Womgn's
Ctr., Inc. v. Mcrlonagle, 813 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1987), on remand, 665 F. Supp.
1147 (EI). Pa. 1987), 670 F. Supp. 1300 (El). Pa. 1987), cert. denied, 493 US.
901 (1989).
=' Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. at 1100.
=o Id. at 1102. As discussed earlier, direct benefit to the union is not essential,
so long as those guilty of the racketeering behavior were empoworcd to commit
the violation by virtue of their placement in the organization. See cupra notes 154-
157 and accompanying text.
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Court, in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, recognized that the
continuity of racketeering activity can be demonstrated
through a "threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the
future [or] ... as part of an ongoing entity's regular way of
doing business."2 '
Although the Fowler court held that under Northwestern
Bell, a pattern of predicate acts occurring over a nine month
period is insufficient to establish racketeering activity, 2 the
Supreme Court made it very clear that a plaintiff must demon-
strate that either the predicate acts themselves, or the threat
of future repetition of those acts, constituted continuing racke-
teering activity.' By permitting the threat of future acts to
constitute "continuing racketeering activity," the Court clearly
de-emphasized the importance of RICO's substantial duration
requirement. Indeed, the Court indicated as much:
Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threaten-
ing no future criminal conduct do not satisfy [RICO's substantial-
duration] requirement: Congress was concerned in RICO with long-
term criminal conduct. Often a RICO action will be brought before
continuity can be established in this way. In such cases, liability
depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated."2
Proving a "threat of continuity" typically will not be diffi-
cult in the sexual harassment context, where the behavior
occurs in patterns that rarely suggest a limited time frame."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not set a fixed minimum
time frame for the predicates to occur before a RICO action
will stand." It is, therefore, conceivable that the Court will
recognize a pattern of racketeering activity even when predi-
cate acts extend only over a few weeks or months, so long as
there is a threat of future criminal conduct. 7
In Fowler's case, Meek had sexually harassed her for a
period of nine months, not an insignificant duration of time.
But even if nine months were not sufficiently substantial,
there is no question that Meek conditioned Fowler's employ-
=' Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 242.
=2 Fowler, 763 F. Supp. at 865.
Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 240.
=' Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
"3 Id. at 242-43.
" Sharpe, 835 F. Supp. at 35.
23 Id. at 35 n.2.
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ment upon her sexual submission and made threats to her
indicating his intention to continue the harassment indefinite-
ly. The Fowler court's conclusion, therefore, that the plaintiff
offered no evidence suggesting the threat of future harassment
seems misguided.'
In jurisdictions where RICO sexual harassment suits are
recognized, RICO affords additional advantages over current
employment statutes. RICO's generous statute of limitations
period is, for example, a tremendous asset to Title VII plain-
tiffs, who ordinarily must report violations of the statute
within one year of the alleged discriminatory acts.
B. RICO: A Viable Source of Relief for Sexual Harassment
Victims
1. Statute of Limitations
Under Title VII, the complainant must file the discrimina-
tion charge within 180 days from the date when the sexual
harassment occurs, or 300 days, depending upon the state in
which she resides. 9 Except for the limited circumstances in
which she may request an extension to the filing date,"' the
claimant must file within the applicable time period, or lose
the opportunity to file the charge.24' If the claimant fails to
file the charge, she cannot pursue her claim in court because
Title VII requires that a claimant exhaust all administrative
remedies before pursuing a claim in federal court.242
RICO's statute of limitations offers many advantages over
that of Title VII. First, civil RICO actions are subject to a four-
' Fowler, 763 F. Supp. at 865.
"9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1988).
2" Some examples of extenuating circumstances are (1) if the claimant was
misled regarding the real reason behind the discriminatory actions; (2) if the
claimant was misled by her employer regarding her legal rights, after complaining
to her employer, and (3) if, due to hardship, the claimant has a legitimate reason
for being unable to file the charge. WILLIHM PETROCELLI & BARBARA KATE REPA,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB, 6118-6120 (1992). The time for filing an EEOC
complaint is not extended merely because the employee attempts to resolve the
issue through internal company procedures, although many states will add the
time spent utilizing company grievance procedure to the total time one has to file
with the EEOC. Id. at 6120.
2n 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1988).
2" Id.
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year statute of limitations,"5 which provides significantly
more time for a sexual harassment victim to bring her claim
than she would otherwise have under Title VII. 4 There are
varying interpretations of the statute, however, regarding the
date from which the four year period accrues. As one court
stated, the Courts of Appeals have applied "a smorgasbord of
civil RICO accrual rules."24 5
The First, Second, Fourth and Ninth circuits have adopted
the "injury discovery rule," or what is sometimes referred to as
the "simple discovery rule." 6 Under this rule, every time the
claimant suffers an injury caused by a RICO violation, her
cause of action for that injury accrues from "the time [sihe
discover[s] or should have discovered the injury."' 4 If the
claimant suffers from a later injury, she is again injured in her
business or property, and her right to sue for her damages
accrues from the time she discovers or should have discovered
that injury. By this standard, each injury holds its own accrual
date, and the claimant must sue before the statute of limita-
tions ends on a particular injury, or she loses her right to a
remedy."4
The Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits, on the other
hand, have refused to adopt this standard, recognizing that the
"injury discovery rule" poses some problems. 9 If the first
' See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
The Supreme Court applied a four year statute of limitations primarily because
RICO was modeled after the Clayton Act, which provides for a four year statute of
limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1994). The Court held that "[tlogether with the
similarities in purpose and structure between RICO and the Clayton Act, the clear
legislative intent to pattern RICO's civil enforcement provision on the Clayton Act
strongly counsels in favor of application of the four year statute of limitations
used for Clayton Act claims." Id. at 152.
2" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988).
2" Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1991).
" JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 143; See Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664
(1st Cir. 1990); Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271 (9th
Cir. 1988); Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d
211 (4th Cir. 1987).
3" Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
I" ld. at 1103.
See Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1991); Bath v.
Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990); Bivens Gardens
Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 (1991).
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predicate act causing an injury occurs four years before the
second predicate act causes an injury, the statute of limitations
on the first predicate will have expired before the RICO claim
would have had time to mature. Those circuits therefore have
adopted the "injury/pattern discovery rule,%  under which
the statute of limitations commences on a civil RICO action
when the "plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discov-
ered, both [the] existence and source of [his or her] injury and
that [the] injury is part of [a] pattern."-1
The Third Circuit has adopted a slight variation on the
"injury/pattern discovery rule." Under this circuit's "last predi-
cate act rule," if the plaintiff suffers a later injury, or a later
predicate act occurs, the accrual period begins when the plain-
tiff knew or should have known of her last injury or the last
predicate act constituting the same pattern of racketeering."
Under this rule, if a plaintiff files her complaint within four
years of the last injury she suffered or the last predicate act,
the plaintiff can potentially recover for additional injuries
caused by predicate acts which occurred in an earlier limita-
tions period but that are nevertheless part of the same
"pattern.2"
Under any of the three rules articulated above, civil RICO
provides the sexual harassment victim with a longer statute of
limitations period than either Title VII or most state employ-
ment discrimination statutes. The "last predicate act rule" may
be preferable to the other rules because it affords the claimant
the longest period to file her claim. Even the "injury discovery
rule," however, tolls the statute of limitations from the last
injury, and the only injury one can claim in the sexual harass-
ment context is the loss of employment, which occurs after
the last predicate act of extortion.' The only difficulty under
20 JOSEPH, supra note 87, at 143.
2* Bivens, 906 F.2d at 1556-57.
"2 Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1988).
21 Id. at 1130-31.
2" As indicated earlier, emotional injuries are not compensable under Civil
RICO. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
" The harassed employee's injury is her lost employment Id. The last pred-
icate act of extortion (ie., instance of sexual harassment) will occur before the em-
ployee is terminated or forced out. Sexual harassment that might occur after Bhe
separates from her employment would not constitute racheteering activity because
the threat of termination, and therefore extortion, no longer exists.
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the "injury discovery rule" arises when the predicate acts or
injuries occur four years apart, and thereby fail to constitute
racketeering activity. But, as with any RICO claim, if pred-
icates are so remote to one another, it may serve the statute
not to recognize them as constituting a pattern of racketeering
activity.
2. Remedies Against Small Employers
Another limitation of Title VII is that it only applies to
employers of fifteen employees or more. 6 Without RICO,
therefore, employees of small businesses who are victims of
sexual harassment have no federal cause of action. RICO pro-
vides a viable cause of action for employees of small businesses
because the statute, unlike Title VII, does not limit the avail-
ability of its remedies based on the size of the organization
committing a racketeering violation. 7 A RICO action, how-
ever, is subject to different organizational requirements than
Title VII claims which may ultimately affect the standing of
the claim.
Governmental agencies, for example, whether they be
municipal, 8 state 9 or federal26° are not subject to civil
liability under RICO, although those agencies may bring ac-
tions as plaintiffs under Section 1964(c) of the statute.261 This
differs greatly from Title VII, which provides a cause of action
against both public and private organizations. 2 2 Under either
Title VII or RICO, therefore, plaintiffs employed by public
organizations of fewer than fifteen employees would still be left
without a cause of action.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
2" 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) & (4) (1988); see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 583 (1981).
" See Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d
397 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992); Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty.
Gov't, 743 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Ky. 1990); Biondolillo v. City of Sunrise, 736 F.
Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1990); accord North Star Contracting Corp. v. Long Island
R.R., 723 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re CitiSource, Inc. Secs. Litig., 694 F.
Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Massey v. Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.
Okla. 1986).
See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991).
260 See Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1991).
261 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
262 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
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Although RICO does not cover public organizations, it is
expansive in its applicability to private organizations. Unlike
Title VII, which only applies to employers,' RICO applies to
any ongoing enterprise, formal or informal, that functions as a
continuing unit.2 Courts define an enterprise under the
statute as any "individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity."' RICO, therefore, allows a wider
variety of organizations to be open to suits by sexual harass-
ment victims than does Title VII. A sense of the wider protec-
tion civil RICO provides becomes apparent upon consideration
of the following hypothetical.
The Smiths, a young married couple, employ Margaret, a
nanny, to care for their five-year-old son, and to assist them
with various household chores. They do not pay social security
taxes to the federal government for her, and Margaret does not
report her income to the government. She is their only employ-
ee.
After a few weeks in the Smiths' employ, Mr. Smith begins
taking long lunches and returns home during the day to get to
know Margaret. He tells her he is very attracted to her and
that from the moment he met her he has wanted to kiss her.
Margaret graciously rebuffs his advances, reminding him that
she is engaged and that she is not interested. Mr. Smith per-
sists, and one afternoon forcibly kisses Margaret on the lips.
Margaret pushes him away, and threatens to tell his wife.
Over the course of the next month, Mr. Smith continues to
make his afternoon visits, and he becomes progressively more
physical with Margaret, touching her breasts, kissing her neck
and speaking lewdly to her. Quite distraught, Margaret reports
Mr. Smith's behavior to Mrs. Smith, who tells Margaret that
she does not care, that it is harmless flirtation and that Mr.
Smith "can be a bit of a dog sometimes."
Over the course of the next six or seven months, Mr.
Smith continues to make physical advances on Margaret and
regularly refers to her around the house as "the bitch." One
2 This is not entirely true; Title VII also applies to labor unions. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(c) (1988).
=" United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
' Id. at 580. Such an enterprise is seen as something completely distinguish-
able from the "pattern of racketeering activity that forms the violation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (1988).
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evening, Mr. Smith comes into the kitchen while Margaret is
doing the dishes, puts his hand on her buttocks, and whispers
in her ear, "if you want to keep this job, you better start putt-
ing in more time with the boss." Margaret drops the dishes,
retains an attorney, and files a RICO action against Mr. and
Mrs. Smith for a pattern of extortion of her business and prop-
erty interests in her employment. She also pends a state cause
of action against Mr. Smith for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress."'
Without RICO, Margaret would have no cause of action
under any other federal statute. 7 Mr. and Mrs. Smith only
employed Margaret, and therefore would not be subject to Title
VII regulations, which require that the employer employ a
minimum of fifteen employees. It is also unlikely she would
have a cause of action under state or municipal law, since most
local sexual harassment laws provide for a minimum number
of employees.2 8 Under RICO, however, her property interests
in her employment remain viable, and the extortion she is
subjected to is no less egregious.
The fact that Mr. and Mrs. Smith failed to pay Social
Security taxes, or that Margaret did not report her income to
the government, will have no effect on her claim because, as
mentioned earlier, civil RICO restricts the activities of legiti-
mate as well as illegitimate business." 9  Furthermore,
Margaret's action against Mrs. Smith will stand because Mrs.
Smith's failure to act, in light of her knowledge of Mr. Smith's
behavior, implicated her as a co-conspirator to a pattern of
extortionY
" This example is based on several sexual harassment suits. The state claim
can be pursued in the same forum due to federal pendant jurisdiction.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
'" Thirty of the fifty state sexual harassment laws limit their coverage to em-
ployers of at least two employees. Twenty-five of the fifty state sexual harassment
laws do not permit actions against domestic employers. PETROCELUI & REPS, supra
note 240, at 7, 16-36.
2" See supra notes 41-53.
270 See Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D. Mass 1986).
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CONCLUSION
There are three main elements which must be satisfied in
order for any RICO action to succeed. First, RICO requires
that an individual be injured in his business or property. Cer-
tain courts that have entertained RICO sexual harassment
suits have interpreted this element broadly. They have found
merit in extortion claims that implicate intangible property
such as "contractual job rights and partnership rights."
The protection of intangible property interests has not neces-
sarily been precluded from RICO actions, 2 and will be es-
sential to any argument in favor of RICO sexual harassment
claims.
Second, RICO requires that a plaintiff be deprived of a
business or property interest through a pattern of racketeering
activity. "Racketeering activity" is defined, statutorily, as "any
act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or deal-
ing in a controlled substance or listed chemical... , which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year." 73 Extortion is the most prevalent
charge brought under RICO in the context of sexual harass-
mentY4 Although "sexual favors" do not necessarily consti-
tute property, per se, the case law has viewed sexual harass-
ment as a vehicle to extort from individuals a property interest
in their employment. 5
Third, a plaintiff must establish that related predicate acts
"amount to... continued criminal activity" by "proving a se-
ries of related predicates extend[ed] over a substantial period
of time." 76 Congress was concerned, when enacting RICO,
that the statute should only apply to enduring criminal con-
1 Sharpe v. Kelley, 835 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D.Mass. 1993).
' See United States v. Local 560 of Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F,2? 267, 281
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding Hobbs Act protects both intangible and tangible property).
= 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
=" See Sharpe, 835 F. Supp. 33; Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097.
"' See id.
27" Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 445.46 (st Cir. 1990) (citing H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. 229, 24142 (1989)).
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duct." However, the Supreme Court has not decided what
constitutes an absolute minimum duration for criminal activity
under RICO." If a plaintiff demonstrates that racketeering
activity poses a threat of "repetition extending indefinitely into
the future [or] ... [is] part of an ongoing entity's regular way
of doing business," such activity falls under RICO. 9 And,
courts have held that if the acts of sexual harassment are not
sporadic but multiple and regular in nature, a span of months
may prove sufficient to make a RICO claimY
If courts interpret statutes only by the limited foresight
expressed by their sponsors, the limitations of human vision
would too often be defeated by the spirit and inspiration of
laws. It is the ability of law to shape with time, while holding
true to the spirit of its original purpose, that makes good law.
Laws are supposed to be predictable and consistent, but also
breathe with, and adapt to, the development of human under-
standing.
The reluctance of critics to embrace broader notions of
extortion demonstrates less prudence than it does prudery.
Employment, although in some sense intangible, is, in every
sense, a real and vital interest. When the employer uses his
power over the employee to derive sexual pleasure, it is neither
logical nor reasonable to conclude that his actions do not con-
stitute extortion simply because they fall outside the tradition-
al conception of the term. Critics will refer to the use of RICO
in the context of sexual harassment as an abuse. It is,
271 Sharpe, 835 F. Supp. at 35.
278 Id.
27 Id. at 35 n.2.
m Id. at 35.
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however, RICO's broad wording which allows it to regulate
racketeering in all forms, as its framers intended.
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